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UNTYING OUR HANDS:
THE CASE FOR UNIFORM PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER "LIBEL TOURISTS"
Todd W. Moore*
This Note analyzes the growing trend of "Libel Tourism, " wherein a
plaintiff files a defamation lawsuit in a foreign forum primarily to avail
himself of its plaintiff-friendly libel laws. Many critics of the practice argue
that (1) such claims can effectively circumvent the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, and (2) U.S. courts should be able to adjudicate the
enforceability of such foreign judgments in the United States. In light of
recent legislative developments, this Note focuses with particularity on
whether, and in what instances, U.S. courts may assert personal
jurisdiction over libel tourists for the purpose of issuing such a declaratory
judgment. After examining existing case law and various arguments for
and against such a jurisdictional assertion, this Note concludes that new
federal legislation allowing personal jurisdiction over libel tourists is both
necessary and constitutional.
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Khalid Salim Bin Mahfouz filed a defamation lawsuit against
Rachel Ehrenfeld in an English court in response to being named a potential
terrorism financier in Ehrenfeld's book Funding Evil: How Terrorism is
Financed-and How to Stop It.' Ehrenfeld chose to default,2 citing the cost
of litigating in a foreign forum, England's plaintiff-friendly defamation
laws, and her objection to Mr. Bin Mahfouz's alleged attempt to "chill" her
speech.3  Then, preempting any attempt by Mahfouz to enforce the
judgment in a U.S. court, she filed for a declaratory judgment in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that the
foreign judgment was unenforceable and repugnant to her First Amendment
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
advisor, Professor Katherine Strandburg, for providing indispensable commentary during the
writing of this Note. I also wish to thank my family and my fiancee Nora for providing
endless and much appreciated support throughout the process.
1. Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 518 F.3d 102, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2008).
2. Id. at 104.
3. Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 832-33 (N.Y. 2007).
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rights.4 One of Ms. Ehrenfeld's claims was that, absent a U.S. court ruling
regarding her rights, Mr. Mahfouz's judgment had the practical effect of
discouraging or "chilling" her protected speech rights in the United States. 5
On December 20, 2007, the New York Court of Appeals held that New
York's long-arm statute did not grant personal jurisdiction over Mahfouz.6
Without personal jurisdiction over a defendant, no U.S. court is able to
adjudicate a case. 7 Thus, the lower court had no choice but to affirm the
dismissal of the case. 8
In response, effective on April 28, 2008, the New York State legislature
enacted the Libel Terrorism Protection Act,9 which, by amending the New
York State long-arm statute,10 granted New York courts "personal
jurisdiction over any person who obtains a judgment in a defamation
proceeding outside the United States against any person who is a resident of
New York... or may have to take actions in New York to comply with the
judgment."" Effectively overruling the New York Court of Appeals'
judgment in Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz,12 the law raises many constitutional
and policy issues. 13 Upon signing the bill into legislation, Governor David
Paterson indicated that many of these issues would remain unresolved until
the federal government enacted similar legislation. 14 In response, Congress
has now swung into action. A proposed bill-passed in the U.S. House of
Representatives on September 27, 2008-would require U.S. courts to
determine that a foreign defamation judgment against a public figure was
4. Id. England's defamation laws are considerably more restrictive of speech than
those of the United States, see infra Part I.A.2, thus facilitating so-called "libel tourism" in
which foreign plaintiffs seek to sue for defamation in forums with plaintiff-favorable laws
and arguably little or no connection to the underlying claim. David A. Schulz, Challenges
Resurface Around Libel Law and the Effects of the Internet Age, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 2, 2008, at
S5. The question of what specific factors qualify one as a "libel tourist" remains largely
unanswered and underlies much of the debate in this Note. See, e.g., infra notes 212-21 and
accompanying text (discussing various views of the requirements of asserting personal
jurisdiction over foreign plaintiffs).
5. Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at 834.
6. Id. at 838. At the time of the court's ruling, the jurisdictional long-arm statute did
not allow for personal jurisdiction to the extent of due process limitations. Id. at 837. The
court was unwilling to characterize the foreign party's actions regarding the foreign lawsuit
as transacting business within the state of New York. Id. at 831; see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)
(McKinney 2008) ("[A] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-
domiciliary.., who in person or through an agent: transacts any business within the
state ... ").
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 518 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 2008).
9. 2008 N.Y. Sess. Laws 586 (McKinney) (codified as amended at N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§
302(d), 5304(b)(8) (McKinney Supp. 2009)).
10. For a discussion of long-arm statutes, see Part I.B. 1.
11. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(d).
12. 881 N.E.2d 830, 838 (N.Y. 2007) (dismissing the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction).
13. See infra Part II.
14. Jennifer McDermott & Chaya F. Weinberg-Brodt, Growth of 'Libel Tourism' in
England and U.S. Response, N.Y. L.J., June 4, 2008, at 4.
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consistent with the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution before
enforcing it in a U.S. court. 15 However, this bill does not address issues of
personal jurisdiction over the foreign party seeking a defamation
judgment. 16 Another proposed bill, the Federal Free Speech Protection Act,
would allow personal jurisdiction over any party that filed a defamation
action against a U.S. party in a foreign court. 17  In addition to the
congressmen proposing and sponsoring the libel tourism bills, 18
considerable public support exists for extending jurisdiction in defamation
cases, 19 including support from organizations like the American Library
Association.20 However, unless the legislature enacts these or similar
provisions and the courts review them, their constitutionality and practical
effects upon libel tourism will remain uncertain.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the modem history of libel
tourism (the filing of defamation lawsuits against U.S. citizens in plaintiff-
friendly foreign courts with arguably tenuous connections to the underlying
claim). In particular, Part I presents some of the fundamental differences
between the libel laws of the United States and those of England and
includes an overview of the possible chilling effects that libel tourism may
have upon the constitutionally protected speech rights of U.S. parties.
Before proceeding to the crux of the Note-personal jurisdiction in a libel
tourism context-Part I also details the applicable policies and relevant
statutes relating to recognition of foreign judgments in U.S. courts. It then
concludes with an overview of the fundamentals and development of
personal jurisdiction doctrine in the United States. Part II examines the
15. H.R. 6146, 1 10th Cong. (2008).
16. Id.
17. Free Speech Protection Act of 2008, S. 2977, 110th Cong. (2008). For the
companion bill in the House of Representatives, see H.R. 5814, 110th Cong. (2008). This
Note refers to the 2008 version of the Free Speech Protection Act for primarily illustrative
purposes. However, please note that a similar 2009 version has also been introduced. See
Free Speech Protection Act of 2009, S. 449, 111 th Cong. (2009).
18. See Arlen Specter & Joe Lieberman, Foreign Courts Take Aim at Our Free Speech,
WALL ST. J., July 14, 2008, at A15, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB121599561708449643.html (comparing libel tourism to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
wherein civil rights opponents filed libel lawsuits to prevent news organizations from
exposing state officials' refusal to enforce federal civil rights laws); Press Release, Sen. Joe
Lieberman, Specter, Lieberman, King Introduce Free Speech Protection Act (May 7, 2008),
available at http://lieberman.senate.gov/newsroom /release.cfm?id=2973 83.
19. See, e.g., David Horowitz, NY State's "Libel Terrorism Protection Act, " FRONTPAGE
MAG., Feb. 1, 2008, http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=ACAA01C4-
54AB-4D70-BA4C-EClC6504C2ED (indicating that Bin Mahfouz has silenced forty
authors and publishers and advocating for an expansion of the New York long-arm statute);
Posting of David Ardia to Citizen Media Law Project, http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog
/2008/revisiting-foreign-libel-laws-pernicious-impact-first-amendment-speech (July 15,
2008) (supporting the Free Speech Protection Act of 2008).
20. Press Release, American Library Association, ALA Endorses the Free Speech
Protection Act of 2008 (July 31, 2008) (encouraging the American Library Association's
approximately 66,000 members and others to lobby for the passage of the Free Speech
Protection Act of 2008).
2009] 3209
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
arguments for and against exercising personal jurisdiction over libel
tourists. These arguments focus principally on whether jurisdiction is
properly asserted via application of the effects test (originally articulated by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones).21 Part III argues in support of
the practicality and constitutionality of a federal jurisdictional statute
granting personal jurisdiction over libel tourists under limited
circumstances.
1. LIBEL TOURISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Libel Tourism: A Brief Background of a Modern Trend
"Libel tourism" is a growing trend in today's international arena.22
Essentially, the practice involves foreign plaintiffs, like Mr. Mahfouz, filing
defamation actions in forums with defamation laws favorable to their
claims.2 3 As a prime example, because England's defamation laws vary
greatly from those of the United States, 24 plaintiffs often file suit in England
with the hope of achieving favorable outcomes otherwise unavailable under
the protections of U.S. defamation law. 25
1. U.S. Libel Law: Heightened Constitutional Standards
The Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory communication generally
as one that "tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in
the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating
or dealing with him." 26  Generally, a written defamatory statement
constitutes libel, while a spoken one constitutes slander.27  Since the
Supreme Court ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,28 the law of
defamation falls largely within the ambit of the First Amendment to the
21. 465 U.S. 783, 786 (1984).
22. McDermott & Weinberg-Brodt, supra note 14; see also Adam Cohen, 'Libel
Tourism': When Freedom of Speech Takes a Holiday, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A24;
Jennifer Howard, News Analysis: U.S. Librarians, Authors, and Publishers Weigh the
Chilling Effects of 'Libel Tourism,' CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 25, 2008, available at
http://chronicle.com/free/2008/06/3539n.htm (discussing several recent "libel tourism"
cases).
23. See Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 831-32 (N.Y. 2007).
24. See infra Part I.A.2.
25. McDermott & Weinberg-Brodt, supra note 14.
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). However, a statement need not
actually cause harm to one's reputation to be defamatory-it needs only to be the type of
statement that tends to have such effects. Id. § 559 cmt. d. Yet, the Restatement indicates
that "actual harm" is necessary if a plaintiff hopes to recover damages. Id. § 621; see Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (requiring "actual injury" for
compensation).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568.
28. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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U.S. Constitution.29 In New York Times Co., the commissioner of the City
of Montgomery, Alabama, whose duties included supervising the police and
fire departments, sued the New York Times for libel based on an
advertisement run in its paper. 30 The ad alleged that the Montgomery
police had expelled and harassed student protestors and intimidated Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., by arresting him seven times. 31 As a general
policy matter, the Supreme Court held that debate on public issues should
remain uninhibited and that constitutionally protected speech may include
"vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks. ' 32
Underlying this policy was the fear that a lower standard would deter
"would-be critics of official conduct ... from voicing their criticism...
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of
having to do SO." ' 3 3 Given these concerns, the Court held that a public
official has a heightened burden of establishing clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant asserted the allegedly defamatory speech with
"actual malice" (i.e., that the defendant either had knowledge that the
statement was false or acted with a reckless disregard for the statement's
potential falsity).34
Further constitutional restrictions followed as the Court continued to
provide heightened speech protections. 35 In subsequent cases, the Court
applied a variant of the "actual malice" standard to public figures (as
opposed to the narrower category of public officials).36 Significantly, in
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,37 the Supreme Court mandated
29. Id. at 269; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS div. 5 Special Note on the Impact
of the First Amendment of the Constitution on the Law of Defamation. The First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in relevant part, "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
requirements of the First Amendment of the Constitution apply to individual states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 277 (citations omitted).
30. 376 U.S. at 256.
31. Id. at 257-58.
32. Id. at 270 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)).
33. Id. at 279.
34. Id. at 279-80.
35. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620
(2003) (placing the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff); BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB,
536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002) (requiring a public official to meet a heightened burden of proof
regarding the defendant's state of mind); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21
(1990) (applying a heightened showing of knowledge of a statement's falsity or a reckless
disregard for truth to public figure defamation cases).
36. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989). What
constitutes a public figure is a topic outside the scope of this Note. However, the Supreme
Court has indicated that those individuals that will be considered public figures "have
assumed roles of especial prominence" in society. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
345 (1974).
37. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
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that the plaintiff bear the burden of proving the falsity of an allegedly
defamatory statement. 38
2. Contrasting U.S. and English Libel Law
Having discussed some fundamentals of U.S. libel law, this Note now
examines some key differences between libel laws in the United States and
England.39 While some aspects of U.S. defamation law fall within state
purview, the constitutional parameters promote a degree of uniformity in
U.S. defamation law that provides a foundation for comparison to laws of
other countries. 40  Thus, one can discern stark contrasts between the
defamation laws of the United States and those of England.4 1
England's defamation law retains many principles that had been a part of
common law in the various states of the United States until the Supreme
Court began overturning them, beginning with the aforementioned New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964.42 Specifically, in England, an allegedly
defamatory statement is presumed false, and the defendant has the burden
of proving it true.43 If a defendant cannot prove the truth of a statement, the
jury then must decide whether it is defamatory.44  Additionally, the
defendant's state of mind, or "fault," is not taken into account-the
defendant may honestly believe what he said and still be found liable for
defamation. 45
38. Id. at 776-77 (holding that a "common-law presumption that defamatory speech is
false cannot stand").
39. Unfortunately, a comprehensive analysis of all the differences between the
defamation laws of the United States and England is beyond the scope of this Note.
40. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:9 (2d ed. 2008). The Restatement
(Second) of Torts describes the elements of a U.S. defamation action to be as follows:
To create liability for defamation there must be:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the
existence of special harm caused by the publication.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
41. For a detailed analysis of the differences in libel laws between, for example,
Maryland and England, see Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).
42. See Raymond W. Beauchamp, Note, England's Chilling Forecast: The Case for
Granting Declaratory Relief to Prevent English Defamation Actions from Chilling American
Speech, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3073, 3078 (2006) (detailing the various changes in U.S.
defamation law during the twentieth century and its prior similarities to that of England).
43. Id.
44. See Berkoff v. Burchill, [1996] 4 All E.R. 1008, 1010-13 (C.A.) (Eng.) (question
submitted to jury).
45. Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1995); see SMOLLA, supra note
40, § 1:9 (suggesting that English libel law is akin to a strict liability doctrine).
3212 [Vol. 77
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In contrast, U.S. defamation law places the burden on the plaintiff to
prove a statement's falsity.46 The court also acts as a kind of gatekeeper: it
must first determine whether a statement is capable of a defamatory
meaning before submitting the statement to a jury.47  The jury then
determines whether the statement's recipient in fact understood it to be
defamatory. 48 For an opinion to be actionable in the United States, it must
be provably false as a matter of law-in other words, one must be able
reasonably to interpret it as stating or implying actual facts.49 Finally, if the
statement relates to matters of public concern or the plaintiff is a public
figure, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant made the
statement with a particular state of mind or level of "fault." 50
Due to these various conflicting standards, U.S. courts have refused to
recognize or enforce certain foreign defamation judgments because they can
deprive a plaintiff of his rights as embodied in the U.S. Constitution or a
particular state constitution.51 Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications
Inc.52 is such a case wherein a court held that enforcement of a foreign
defamation judgment would deprive an individual of constitutional rights. 53
Specifically, a New York State court refused to enforce a foreign
defamation judgment against a New York operator of a news service.54 An
Indian national had sued the news service operator in England for
defamation based on a story that the operator had wired to one New York
newspaper and two Indian newspapers distributed in the United Kingdom,
obtaining a judgment of £40,000 and attorney's fees. 55 When the foreign
party sued to enforce the judgment in New York, the court held that the
foreign party's "failure ... to prove falsity in the High Court of Justice in
46. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at
4; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 (1977) (listing several burdens of proof that
the plaintiff must meet in order to establish an actionable defamation claim).
47. Sellers v. Okla. Publ'g Co., 687 P.2d 116, 120 (Okla. 1984); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 614 (stating that the court decides "(a) whether a communication is
capable of bearing a particular meaning, and (b) whether that meaning is defamatory"). If
the court answers "no" to either of these questions, it must dismiss the case as no triable
issue is present to submit to the jury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 614 cmt. b.
48. Healey v. New Eng. Newspapers, Inc., 520 A.2d 147, 150 (R.I. 1987) (citing Cianci
v. N.Y. Times Publ'g, 639 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
614).
49. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16 (1990).
50. Id. at 20-21; Michael F. Sutton, Note, Legislating the Tower of Babel: International
Restrictions on Internet Content and the Marketplace of Ideas, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 417,
421-22 (2004) (discussing the "actual malice" standard).
51. See, e.g., Abdullah v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 2515 (LLS), 1994
WL 419847, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994) (dismissing a cause of action because
"establishment of a claim under the British law of defamation would be antithetical to the
First Amendment protections accorded the defendants"); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d
230, 251 (Md. 1997) (refusing to enforce a foreign defamation judgment).
52. 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
53. Id. at 664.
54. Id. at 664-65.
55. Id. at 661-62.
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England makes his judgment unenforceable here." 56 In other words, the
foreign judgment was unenforceable because the process involved in
obtaining it fell short of fundamental U.S. constitutional requirements. 57
Finally, while not necessarily constituting a difference in substantive
defamation law, a foreign court's jurisdictional requirements in hearing
such a case may vary significantly with those of the United States. 58 In
libel tourism cases, for example, a foreign forum's jurisdictional basis may
be somewhat tenuous by U.S. standards, thus facilitating the previously
detailed controversy regarding substantive legal differences. 59 English
courts have assumed jurisdiction over a defendant because his allegedly
defamatory material was available via the Internet. 60 In Ehrenfeld, the
publisher of Rachel Ehrenfeld's book never officially published it in
England. 61 However, because twenty-three copies were purchased in the
United Kingdom via the Internet and a portion of the book was available on
a website, the English court found adequate jurisdiction to hear the case. 62
The plaintiff defaulted, objecting that she should not be subject to the law
of England as she "never lived in England[,] ... [Funding Evil] was never
published in England[,] ... and [she has] never taken any steps to cause the
Book to be made available to purchasers in England or to facilitate its
availability there through internet sources." 63 Regardless, the English court
entered a default judgment requiring, among other things, that the plaintiff
and her publisher issue an apology, enjoining further publication of the
statements in England and Wales, and awarding £10,000 in damages. 64
3. Libel Tourism's Potential Chilling Effects on the Protected Speech of
U.S. Parties
Once obtained, a foreign defamation judgment may have various
implications. This section details one possible implication: the potential to
chill protected speech rights in the United States. U.S. courts have
recognized (or at the very least considered) that the mere uncertainty of
whether a foreign judgment is enforceable or will be enforced in a U.S.
56. Id. at 664. The court also indicated that enforcement of the judgment would violate
the First Amendment of the Constitution because the plaintiff had not established that the
defendant was at fault. Id.
57. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986) (indicating as a
U.S. constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of proving a statement's
falsity).
58. See infra Part I.B (detailing the fundamentals of U.S. personal jurisdiction doctrine).
59. See, e.g., Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 832 (N.Y. 2007) (indicating
that an English court found jurisdiction when several books were ordered online and shipped
to the United Kingdom).
60. See, e.g., King v. Lewis, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1329 (Eng.).
61. 881 N.E.2d at 832.
62. Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC (QB) 1156 (Eng.), available at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2005/1156.html.
63. Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at 833 n.3.
64. Id. at 833.
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court may have the potential to chill speech.65 For example, in Yahoo! Inc.
v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme,66 Yahoo! sought a
declaratory judgment that a French court's interim order was unenforceable
in a U.S. court. 67 Essentially, the French court had required Yahoo! to
prevent French users from being able to access Nazi-related memorabilia
that had been for sale on Yahoo.com. 68 The first order, issued on May 22,
2000, required Yahoo! to "take all necessary measures to dissuade and
render impossible any access [from French territory] via Yahoo.com to the
Nazi artifact auction service" and other Nazi-related sites.69 Among other
stipulations, the order stated that Yahoo! would be subject to fines of
E100,000 per day of delay and required Yahoo! to display a warning to
users of Yahoo! France (the French counterpart of Yahoo.com).70 A second
interim order, dated November 20, 2000, specified that Yahoo! must
comply within three months or again face monetary penalties. 71 While the
French parties indicated that Yahoo! appeared to be complying to a
satisfactory degree, 72 they were prepared to enforce the French judgment if
Yahoo! "'revert[ed] to their old ways and violate[d] French law.' 73
Yahoo! filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, seeking a declaratory judgment that the orders were
unenforceable in the United States. 74  The court found personal
jurisdiction, 75 that the suit was ripe, and that the First Amendment
precluded the enforcement of the orders in the United States. 76 On the
case's subsequent appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
in response to Yahoo!'s claims that its actions were being "chilled, '77
65. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et 'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1211 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
66. 433 F.3d 1199.
67. Id. at 1204.
68. Id. at 1202.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1202-04.
71. Id. at 1203-04.
72. Yahoo! had recently instituted a policy prohibiting the use of auctions or
advertisements on Yahoo.com "'to offer or trade in items that are associated with or could be
used to promote or glorify"' hate groups. Id. at 1205. However, the district court found these
policies did not place Yahoo! in full compliance with the court's order as such items were
still available through its services. Id.
73. Id. at 1204.
74. Id.
75. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d
1168, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2001). The court found personal jurisdiction after reviewing the
French party's motion to dismiss. Id. at 1171.
76. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'den banc, 433 F.3d 1199. The court made these findings
after reviewing Yahoo!'s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1183.
77. Yahoo! claimed that it faced a substantial and increasing penalty if it was found to
violate the French court's orders and if those orders were enforceable. Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d
at 1210. The district court found that the case was ripe as the interim orders required Yahoo!
"to interpret an impermissibly overbroad and vague definition of the content that is
proscribed." Yahoo!, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
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indicated that "the very existence of [the foreign judgment] may be thought
to cast a shadow on the legality of Yahoo!'s current policy. '78
However, despite a finding of personal jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit
dismissed the case for lack of ripeness 79 largely because the French court's
interim orders did not yet require definite restrictions on Yahoo!, and thus
the court could not decide the extent to which any First Amendment rights
would be violated.80  Specifically, in order to issue the requested
declaratory judgment, the court would have had to decide whether the
judgment was "repugnant to public policy" in its jurisdiction.81 Because,
among other reasons, the interim orders were subject to later modifications,
the court held that it could not adjudicate the exact extent of the order's
effects within the United States. 82  Thus, while acknowledging the
existence of a sufficient effect for personal jurisdiction,83 the court was
reluctant to find the effect sufficient for purposes of ripeness. 84
The various opinions evidenced a disagreement over exactly what
circumstances engender sufficient "chilling" effects. In his concurrence,
Judge Warren Ferguson, with whom Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain and
Judge Atsushi Tashima joined, indicated that, while the foreign lawsuit may
eventually cause harm to Yahoo! in California, the foreign party's filing of
a lawsuit (its "express aim") was an action localized in France. 85 Thus,
Judge Ferguson would not have even found personal jurisdiction. 86 Judge
O'Scannlain, on the other hand, argued that mere litigation of a claim in a
foreign court was never sufficient grounds to confer personal jurisdiction.87
Judge Tashima similarly argued that the effects test did not apply to foreign
court orders. 88 However, in contrast, Judge Raymond Fisher, joined by four
other judges, argued that the uncertainties engendered by the mere existence
of the foreign judgment provided a "compelling basis" for the court to hear
Yahoo!'s challenge. 89 Judge Fisher argued that the court should find
sufficient personal jurisdiction and ripeness or risk quashing
"constitutionally protected speech" in the United States. 90
78. Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1211.
79. Ripeness is the requirement that a controversy be definite enough to avoid premature
court adjudication of abstract or pure policy disagreements. Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v.
Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08 (2003).
80. Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1211-28.
81. Id. at 1215.
82. Id. at 1215, 1217-18.
83. Id. at 1211.
84. See id. at 1217-18, 1224.
85. Id. at 1225 (Ferguson, J., concurring).
86. See id.
87. Id. at 1229 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 1233 (Tashima, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 1242 (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. Id. at 1253. In Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, booksellers sought to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute restricting the display of obscene material. 484
U.S. 383, 388-89, 393 (1988). The Court noted that, even though the statute had not been
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In Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd.,9 1 Dow Jones similarly claimed that
defending a defamation suit filed in London would cause it "to incur
enormous expenses and divert its editors and writers from their journalistic
endeavors" and, additionally, "to operate with the uncertainty" of whether it
could continue to publish the article in question without facing liability.
92
Similarly, in Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, Rachel Ehrenfeld claimed that the
mere existence of a foreign defamation judgment against her had prevented
her from writing freely and had made publishers hesitant to publish her
further work.93 However, the New York Court of Appeals declined to rule
on this issue, confining its decision to whether personal jurisdiction was
warranted under the then-applicable statute.94 While many parties continue
to voice concerns regarding these potential chilling effects, 95 U.S. courts
have yet to reach a consensus on the extent and legal ramifications of such
effects within the United States. 96
4. The Principle of Comity and Enforceability of Foreign Judgments
While a court's analysis regarding the recognition of foreign defamation
judgments is a complex issue somewhat distinct from the jurisdictional
focus of this Note,9 7 many of the policies and doctrines influencing U.S.
courts in recognizing (or refusing to recognize) such judgments may be
relevant to this Note's jurisdictional focus. This section details some of
those policies.
Underlying the doctrine of recognition of foreign judgments against U.S.
parties is the general principle that, to be enforceable in the United States, a
foreign judgment must be obtained through some kind of fair or impartial
process. 98 Complementing this concern for the rights of U.S. citizens is the
enforced, the harm was "one of self-censorship; a harm that can be realized even without an
actual prosecution." Id. at 393.
91. 237 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 346 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2003).
92. Id. at 403. However, the district court refused to recognize the alleged chilling
effects as sufficient to present an actual controversy. Id. at 410.
93. 881 N.E.2d 830, 836 (N.Y. 2007); see Sutton, supra note 50, at 431 (discussing the
potentially high legal costs and uncertainties incurred by a defendant when sued for
defamation in a foreign forum).
94. Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at 834 ("However pernicious the effect of this practice may
be, our duty here is to determine whether defendant's New York contacts establish a proper
basis for jurisdiction .... "). The court did allow that the "threatened enforcement of the
English judgment may benefit defendant by chilling plaintiff's speech." Id. at 837.
95. See, e.g., Nick Cohen, A Free Speech Crusade We Should All Be Proud to Join,
EVENING STANDARD (London), Nov. 12, 2008, at 12 (indicating that English libel suits are
spreading these chilling effects around the world, specifically affecting places like Ukraine
and human rights charities); Howard, supra note 22 (indicating that unenforced foreign libel
judgments may have adverse effects on one's ability to obtain publishing contracts and even
one's credit rating). New York Governor David Paterson voiced similar concerns. See id.
96. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
97. See infra Part II (discussing personal jurisdiction in a libel tourism context).
98. Linda J. Silberman, Some Judgements on Judgments: A View from America, 19
KING'S L.J. 235, 238 (2008) (U.K.).
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concept of comity. 99 In 1895 in Hilton v. Guyot,100 the Supreme Court
defined comity: "'Comity' ... is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to
the rights of its own citizens . . . ."101 Generally speaking, recognizing and
enforcing foreign judgments is intended, among other things, "to produce a
friendly intercourse between the sovereignties."' 10 2 However, as a general
policy matter, a U.S. court will not enforce a judgment if "the cause of
action on which the judgment was based, or the judgment itself, is
repugnant to the public policy of the United States or of the State where
recognition is sought."' 1 3 The exact threshold at which state or national
interests are sufficiently implicated to warrant this public policy defense is a
matter of some debate. 104 However, generally speaking, if a foreign
judgment impinges upon First Amendment rights, U.S. courts are likely to
find it repugnant to public policy. 105
One concern in enforcing foreign judgments is the concept of reciprocity
or, in other words, whether a foreign country will enforce U.S. judgments if
the United States does not act in kind. 106 A foreign court that has a
99. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
100. 159 U.S. 113.
101. Id. at 163-64.
102. Id. at 165. As an example of the practical effects of comity, according to one study,
treaty partners may be more inclined to liberalize their recognition standards with regard to
foreign judgments if they engage in a mutual atmosphere of trust. Gerhard Walter & Samuel
P. Baumgartner, General Report: The Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments Outside
the Scope of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE BRUSSELS AND LUGANO CONVENTIONS 1, 7
(Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner eds., 2000).
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
482(2)(d) (1987); see Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 237 (Md. 1997) ("Although
foreign judgments are entitled to a degree of deference and respect under the doctrine of
comity, courts will nonetheless deny recognition and enforcement to those foreign judgments
which are inconsistent with the public policies of the forum state.").
104. See Sari Louis Feraud Int'l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 480 (2d Cir. 2007)
(indicating that an analysis of the enforceability of a French copyright judgment must fully
examine the interaction of intellectual property laws with First Amendment rights);
Silberman, supra note 98, at 245 (indicating that a mere difference in applicable law is not
necessarily sufficient to be repugnant to public policy); Charles W. Mondora, Note, The
Public Policy Exception, "The Freedom of Speech, or of the Press," and the Uniform
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1139, 1172 (2008)
(suggesting a reconciliation of various methods of determining repugnancy to public policy).
105. See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 169 F.
Supp. 2d 1181, 1189-90 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding unenforceable a French judgment
because such law would violate the First Amendment), rev'd en banc on other grounds, 433
F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006); Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662
(Sup. Ct. 1992) ("[I]f... the public policy to which the foreign judgment is repugnant is
embodied in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or the free speech
guaranty of the Constitution of this State, the refusal to recognize the judgment should be,
and it is deemed to be, 'constitutionally mandatory."').
106. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT prefatory note, 13
pt. II U.L.A. 5-6 (Supp. 2008). Black's Law Dictionary defines "reciprocity" as "[t]he
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reciprocity requirement will not enforce a judgment of a U.S. court, for
example, if the U.S. court would not enforce the foreign court's own
judgments in similar situations. 107 While U.S. courts do not generally
operate on a theory of reciprocity in enforcing foreign judgments, 108
reciprocity is a formal requirement in several countries.l0 9 Thus, if foreign
courts with reciprocity requirements are to recognize or enforce U.S.
judgments, U.S. courts and legislatures must carefully tailor their own
policies so as not to deviate too greatly from international norms. 1 10
Also relevant to concerns over whether foreign courts will recognize U.S.
judgments is that certain countries employ "mirror image" jurisdiction.11'
In other words, if a country allows certain bases for its own courts to
exercise jurisdiction over foreign defendants, such a country will recognize
another country's similar assertion of jurisdiction. 1 2  For example,
Germany1 13 and Italy 1 4 employ this mirror image approach. Though it
may not have officially adopted it, the United States appears to employ a
method similar to that of the mirror image approach through various
devices for recognition of foreign judgments.115
Several countries resist categorization under the above theories of
enforcement. France, for example, generally does not recognize foreign
judgments over French nationals at all.' 16 Switzerland refuses to recognize
foreign in personam judgments against defendants domiciled within its
borders."17  Also, England recognizes only a few limited acceptable
mutual concession of advantages or privileges for purposes of commercial or diplomatic
relations." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1298 (8th ed. 2004).
107. Silberman, supra note 98, at 238.
108. While the Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot highlighted reciprocity as an important
factor, 159 U.S. 113, 210 (1895), and subsequent statutes have sought to encourage its use,
see UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT prefatory note, 13 pt. II
U.L.A. 5-6, U.S. courts have largely avoided reciprocity in their analyses. Silberman, supra
note 98, at 259-60. In doing so, courts have followed some of the dissent's arguments in
Hilton, 159 U.S. at 234 (Fuller, J., dissenting) (rejecting the reciprocity requirement).
109. Silberman, supra note 98, at 260 (listing Germany and Austria as countries with
reciprocity requirements).
110. See id. at 262 (discussing various considerations in enacting a federal law on
recognizing foreign judgments).
111. Id. at 255.
112. Id.
113. ZivilprozeBordnung [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Statute] Jan. 30, 1877,
Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 83, as amended, § 328.
114. Gazz. Uff., Law 218/95, art. 64(1)(a) (passed May 31, 1995) (published June 3,
1995), translated in 35 I.L.M. 760, 779-80 (1996).
115. See Silberman, supra note 98, at 257 (indicating that most American courts will
recognize a foreign judgment if the basis of the foreign court's jurisdiction is similar to one
that would be appropriate in a U.S. court); infra Part I.A.5.
116. Walter & Baumgartner, supra note 102, at 19-20 (indicating that French courts




grounds for recognition of the jurisdiction of a foreign judgment."l 8 Thus,
despite international consolidations like the European Union, a consensus
on jurisdictional rules has not been reached in a worldwide convention., 19
As these various provisions of foreign countries are each subject to judicial
discretion and diverse public policy concerns, predicting the enforceability
of judgments in foreign courts becomes rather difficult.12 0
5. The Recognition of Money Judgments of Foreign Courts
Having discussed the general principles governing the enforcement of
foreign judgments, this Note now turns to a discussion of various U.S.
codifications of enforcement procedures such as the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act, the Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act, and the Declaratory Judgment Act. These
provisions may help to illustrate current U.S. policies regarding foreign
judgments. The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act,
adopted by approximately sixty percent of the states in some capacity, 121
and its more recent revision, the Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act, adopted by three states,122 seek to have states
treat foreign money judgments as they would those of other states covered
by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. 123 One of the
intended results of this tactic is to increase the likelihood that foreign
countries that employ reciprocity as a basis for recognizing foreign
judgments will recognize U.S. judgments. 124 The drafters intended to
achieve this by codifying a minimum threshold at which a court absolutely
must enforce a foreign judgment. 125 However, the two versions of the act
provide several instances wherein the foreign judgment need not be
conclusive. In the most recent version, the Uniform Foreign-Country
Money Judgments Recognition Act, instances wherein a court "may not"
recognize a judgment rendered in a foreign forum include when that forum
does not provide "procedures compatible with the requirements of due
118. Silberman, supra note 98, at 256 (listing "presence, residence, and various forms of
consent or submission" as the acceptable bases for a foreign court to exercise jurisdiction
and potentially receive recognition in an English court).
119. Id. at 255.
120. Walter & Baumgartner, supra note 102, at 20-21; see Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v.
Harrods, Ltd., 237 F. Supp. 2d 394, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
121. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 pt. II U.L.A. 39 (2002).
122. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 pt. II U.L.A. 5
(Supp. 2008).
123. 3 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN
U.S. COURTS § 20:3 (2007). The Constitution requires that "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
124. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT prefatory note, 13




process of law."'126 In other words, if the foreign forum's procedural laws
do not grant constitutionally adequate protections, the court must not (i.e., it
is not allowed to) recognize the judgment. Under this Act, a court "need
not" (i.e., it has discretion not to) recognize a foreign judgment when "the
judgment or the [claim] ... on which the judgment is based is repugnant to
the public policy of this state or of the United States."1 27 These policies are
not meant to require a foreign court to adhere to every minor procedural
detail required under U.S. law, but rather to foster an international standard
of fairness among nations. 128
6. Declaratory Judgments
While the above provisions are meant to foster friendly international
relations, a U.S. party may still have the power to sue for declaratory relief
that a foreign judgment is unenforceable in a U.S. court. 129 In issuing a
declaratory judgment, a court "[declares] the rights and other legal relations
of any interested party."' 130 Such declarations "shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such." 131
The Supreme Court has since upheld the constitutionality of this provision
in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth.1 32 However, this provision, a
result of the Declaratory Judgment Act, does not confer any additional
jurisdictional powers upon U.S. courts. 133
Thus, before a U.S. court can adjudicate the enforceability of a foreign
defamation judgment, it must have personal jurisdiction over the other
party. 134 In a libel tourism context, a chief concern is what constitutes the
appropriate method of exercising personal jurisdiction over a prior plaintiff
(now a defendant) 135 who has obtained a defamation judgment in a foreign
court against a U.S. party.
126. Id. § 4(b)(1).
127. Id. § 4(c)(3) (brackets in original). Significant debate exists as to what constitutes
this public policy exception. See generally Mondora, supra note 104.
128. Silberman, supra note 98, at 243; see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895)
(discussing comity as fostering friendliness between nations).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937). Specifically, the Court held that the Act was procedural
in nature and, as such, "Congress is acting within its delegated power over the jurisdiction of
the federal courts which the Congress is authorized to establish." Id.
133. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (stating that
"Congress enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend
their jurisdiction").
134. See infra Part I.B.
135. The foreign party is initially a plaintiff that files a lawsuit in a foreign forum.
However, when the U.S. party files an action for declaratory judgment in a U.S. court, the
foreign party becomes a defendant (i.e., the U.S. party's claim for a declaratory judgment is
adverse to the foreign party's interests in receiving or enforcing an actual foreign judgment).
Thus, the prior plaintiff becomes a defendant. See generally Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881
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B. Personal Jurisdiction: A Brief History
Having summarized various domestic and foreign policy concerns, their
embodiment in U.S. acts and statutes, and the legal options available to a
U.S. party in a libel tourism context, this Note now turns to the heart of the
discussion: personal jurisdiction. A chief barrier in determining if a U.S.
court can adjudicate the enforceability of a foreign judgment is whether
personal jurisdiction over the foreign party meets the forum's statutory
requirements and the minimal due process protections of the
Constitution.136
1. Long-Arm Statutes
A court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant before it can
hear a case against him. 137  To invoke personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, a court must apply an applicable federal statute governing
personal jurisdiction 138 or, absent that, the long-arm statute of the state in
which the court resides. 139  A long-arm statute is a state statute that
specifies under what conditions a court sitting in that particular state may
hale a foreign party into its forum.140  However, unless the statute's
enumerated bases for exercising personal jurisdiction are consistent with the
constitutional standard of minimum contacts, the court cannot
constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 141
2. Constitutional Requirements: Minimum Contacts and the Limitations of
Due Process
a. Minimum Contacts
A court's ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant hinges
upon whether the defendant's actions confer upon the court the requisite
"power" to do so. 14 2  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
N.E.2d 830 (N.Y. 2007); Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup.
Ct. 1992).
136. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1205-11 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that, under a long-arm statute coextensive with
due process, personal jurisdiction was warranted over a French organization that had
obtained interim orders in a French court regarding a U.S. party); Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at
833-38 (holding that personal jurisdiction was not warranted under the applicable New York
State long-arm statute over a defendant that had successfully obtained a judgment against the
plaintiff in a foreign court).
137. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C).
139. JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE 24 (5th ed. 2006).
140. Id.
141. See Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 ("[D]ue process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the




Amendment of the Constitution limits a court's ability to render judgments
over nonresident defendants. 143 Constitutional due process requires that the
defendant have "certain minimum contacts" with the forum state such that
the suit "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." ' 144 What this minimum standard truly means in application has
long been an issue of debate. 145 Regardless, its underlying rationale is (1)
to protect a defendant from having to travel to an inconveniently distant
forum and (2) to ensure that states do not unjustifiably overextend their
sovereign powers.146 Today, the "central concern" of personal jurisdiction
is "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,"
leaving issues of state sovereignty a secondary concern. 147 The Court in
Shaffer v. Heitner148 noted that the consequent effect was a greater
tendency among courts to find sufficient contacts. 149 However, sovereignty
concerns may play a greater role in international rather than domestic
jurisdictional analyses. 150 In such situations, comity principles may counsel
one nation to abstain from interfering with another nation's fair and
uncompromising assertion of jurisdiction. '5'
If a defendant does not have continuous and systematic contacts with the
forum, 152 the only jurisdictional option available is to find specific
jurisdiction-meaning jurisdiction based solely on the defendant's contacts
arising specifically from the plaintiffs claim. 153  Additionally, the
plaintiffs unilateral acts toward the defendant are not appropriate bases
143. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84,91 (1978).
144. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
145. See Peter Singleton, Note, Personal Jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 911, 928 (2008) (indicating that various tests are "doctrinally in confusion").
146. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). Indeed, the
Court had previously held that these constitutional limitations may sometimes serve to
"divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment," even when it has "a strong interest
in applying its law to the controversy." Id. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
251, 254 (1958)).
147. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
148. 433 U.S. 186.
149. Id. at 204.
150. 44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 8 (2007).
151. Id. (indicating that comity is derived from a respect for other nations); see infra
notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
152. A defendant's continuous and systematic contacts with a forum are considered
sufficient bases for conferring "general jurisdiction" over him. See Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984) (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
479-80 (1985) (indicating a contract that facilitated a "20-year relationship that envisioned
continuing and wide-reaching contacts" was sufficient for jurisdiction).
153. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 466 U.S. at 414 n.8 (indicating that
specific jurisdiction applies to a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant in
a suit "arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum" (citing Arthur T.
von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144-64 (1966))).
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with which to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant himself,
and, thus, a court will not consider them in its analysis.154
b. Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens or "Unreasonableness"
Even if a court finds sufficient minimum contacts, it may still opt not to
exercise personal jurisdiction in specific cases if, given the exact facts of a
case, such a finding does not comport with fair play and substantial justice
(i.e., haling the defendant into the forum would be unreasonable). 155
Whether personal jurisdiction is reasonable depends on several factors:
"'the burden on the defendant,' 'the forum State's interest in adjudicating
the dispute,' 'the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief,' 'the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies,' and the 'shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."' 156  The
burden is on the defendant to present a compelling case that exercise of
jurisdiction under the specific facts would be unreasonable. 157 However,
such an analysis is fact-specific and a finding of unreasonableness does not
render the relevant statute unconstitutional. 158
According to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, reasonableness, as a standard for jurisdiction, has become a
generally accepted principle of international law. 159 Thus, despite a U.S.
court's proper assertion of personal jurisdiction over a foreign party, the
U.S. court may defer to a foreign forum's greater interest in adjudicating the
matter and dismiss the case. 160 In fact, some courts have applied these
principles of reasonableness as derivatives of comity. 161
154. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1958). The Court noted that the
application of this rule "will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity." Id.
at 253. Thus, in a later case involving a child custody suit, to avoid discouraging separated
parents from entering into reasonable child-visitation agreements, the Supreme Court ruled
that the sending of a child to visit her mother in California is not a contact sufficient to
confer jurisdiction. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1978).
155. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
320 (1945)).
156. Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980)).
157. Id.
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
cmt. g (1987). Specifically, if one interpretation of a U.S. statute conflicts with the law of a
foreign forum with a greater interest in the subject dispute, "international responsibility"
may require a different outcome, though the statute remains otherwise valid. Id.
159. Id. cmts. a & g.
160. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004)
(questioning the application of a U.S. statute to "foreign conduct insofar as that conduct
causes independent foreign harm and that foreign harm alone gives rise to the plaintiffs
claim").
161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
cmt. a; see, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)
(referring to "limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their
powers"). However, a finding of unreasonableness does not require reciprocity.
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c. Purposeful Availment: A Modern Test
Having reviewed the basic fundamentals of personal jurisdiction, this
Note now turns to the development of some modem tests for minimum
contacts. The modem standard for establishing minimum contacts requires
the defendant to have purposefully availed himself of "the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws."'162 Importantly, the defendant need not be
physically present in the forum to meet this requirement. 163 Rather, he need
only purposely direct his efforts toward the residents of the particular
forum. 164 It is important to note that this standard was originally invoked
with regard to commercial actors, and the limit of its scope is unclear. 165
The purposeful availment standard has given rise to several jurisdictional
tests, the most relevant of which is the so-called effects test.
d. The Effects Test
In Calder v. Jones, the Supreme Court applied existing minimum
contacts doctrine to a defamation case, thereby introducing the notion of the
effects test. 166 In Calder, the National Enquirer, Inc., a Florida corporation
with its principal place of business in Florida, 167 published an article in a
national weekly newspaper with a circulation of over 5 million copies,
600,000 of which were sold in California. 168 The article alleged that a
California resident's drinking problems were interfering with her
professional obligations as an entertainer in California. 169 For purposes of
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. a. But
see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 210, 228 (1895) (suggesting that a reciprocity
requirement may exist when enforcing foreign judgments in a U.S. court). Furthermore,
when neither forum has a clearly greater interest in adjudicating the dispute, a U.S. court
may attempt to eliminate the source of the conflict entirely by narrowly interpreting statutes
to reduce international conflict. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. g.
162. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
163. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). The Court noted that
this sentiment was especially necessary in the commercial business context where "it is an
inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is
transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need
for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted." Id.
164. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (reviewing the
application of the purposeful direction standard).
165. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478 (applying the standard to the breach of a franchise
agreement); infra Part II (discussing various views on the scope of the effects test).
166. 465 U.S. 783, 787 n.6 (1984).
167. As a general rule, corporations are considered sufficiently present in the state in
which they are incorporated and the state in which they conduct the principal amount of their
business. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 1066-1067 (3d ed. 2002).
168. Calder, 465 U.S. at 785.
169. Id. at 788 n.9.
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minimum contacts, the Court held that because the "brunt of the harm"
(both emotional distress and injury to reputation) "was suffered in
California," the defendants had sufficient minimum contacts to be haled
into court in California. 170 Importantly, this holding applied to an
intentional tort (defamation) in which the defendants "knew" that the
potential harm was likely to occur in California. 171 While the Court
undoubtedly extended the existing purposeful availment doctrine, the
applicability of the effects test beyond the scope of intentional torts is
somewhat uncertain. 1 72
Notably, the Court also held that First Amendment considerations did not
factor into the personal jurisdiction analysis of a defamation lawsuit
because, as they were already accounted for in the substantive defamation
laws throughout the United States, such factors would "needlessly
complicate an already imprecise inquiry." 173 Thus, because including them
in a jurisdictional analysis would constitute needless "double counting," the
Court declined to apply "special procedural protections to defendants in
libel and defamation actions." 174
3. Modem Jurisdictional Developments
In recent history, legislatures have enacted, or at least proposed, various
statutes that purport to modify or extend existing jurisdictional provisions in
a libel tourism context. In response to the New York Court of Appeals's
holding in Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz,175 the New York State legislature
passed the Libel Terrorism Protection Act, effective on April 28, 2008.176
The Act adds a provision to the state's long-arm statute, granting personal
jurisdiction
over any person who obtains a judgment in a defamation proceeding
outside the United States against any person who is a resident of New
170. Id. at 788-89.
171. Id. at 789-90.
172. See Singleton, supra note 145, at 923-24 (2008) (stating that the Court failed to
explain precisely what constitutes express aiming for purposes of the test); see also Ex parte
Gregory, 947 So. 2d 385, 396 (Ala. 2006) (holding that mere wantonness or negligence is
not enough to warrant personal jurisdiction under the effects test).
173. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790. The Court indicated that, just as it has been hesitant to
allow First Amendment considerations to factor into other analytical contexts, it was averse
to do so with regard to personal jurisdiction. Id. at 790-91. Previously, in Herbert v. Lando,
the Court had refused to allow the substantial litigation costs of defamation suits from
justifying a constitutional privilege limiting inquiries into editorial processes. 441 U.S. 153,
176 (1979).
174. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790-91. Because libel tourism concerns a purported "skirting"
of First Amendment protections via a foreign filing, the Court's rationale may be particularly
relevant to the jurisdictional analysis in a libel tourism context. See infra Part II.
175. 881 N.E.2d 830, 838 & n.10 (N.Y. 2007) (indicating that the defendant had not
"transacted business in New York" as per the applicable enumerated provisions of the long-
arm statute).
176. 2008 N.Y. Sess. Laws 586 (McKinney) (codified as amended at N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§
302(d), 5304(b)(8) (McKinney Supp. 2009)).
3226 [Vol. 77
UNTYING OUR HANDS
York or is a person or entity amenable to jurisdiction in New York who
has assets in New York or may have to take actions in New York to
comply with the judgment, for the purposes of rendering declaratory relief
with respect to that person's liability for the judgment ... to the fullest
extent permitted by the United States constitution .... 177
The provision is intended to grant personal jurisdiction over a party that had
obtained a foreign defamation judgment against a U.S. party so that the
U.S. party may then obtain declaratory relief in a New York court. 178
Following in the footsteps of the New York State legislature, in May
2008, Senator Arlen Specter introduced the Free Speech Protection Act of
2008 to the U.S. Senate. 179 The proposed bill would create a federal cause
of action for "[a]ny United States person against whom a lawsuit is brought
in a foreign country for defamation."' 180 The bill would also allow personal
jurisdiction over a party based merely upon his filing of a defamation action
in a foreign forum against a U.S. party. 18 1 Thus, the proposed bill goes one
step beyond New York's legislation by allowing mere filing, not
obtainment of a judgment, to establish personal jurisdiction. 82  A
companion bill was also introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives. 183
On September 27, 2008, the House of Representatives passed a different
bill that requires that a federal or state court not enforce "a foreign
judgment for defamation that is based upon a publication concerning a
public figure or a matter of public concern" unless the court first establishes
that the judgment is "consistent with the first amendment to the
Constitution of the United States."'184 Thus, the bill seeks to make
mandatory the non-enforcement of foreign defamation judgments that are
repugnant to public policy. However, while the bill addresses substantive
differences in U.S. and foreign laws, it does not address issues of personal
jurisdiction. 185
177. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(d). Previously, the only provision that had any chance of
conferring similar jurisdiction was § 302(a)(1), which essentially granted jurisdiction over
any party that "transacts any business in the state." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) (McKinney
2001). However, the court in Ehrenfeld rejected this possibility. See Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d
at 838.
178. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 cmt. 17 (McKinney Supp. 2009).
179. S. 2977, 110th Cong. (2008). A similar version of this bill was introduced in 2009.
See supra note 17.
180. S. 2977 § 3(a).
181. Id. § 3(b).
182. See id.
183. See H.R. 5814, 110th Cong. (2008).
184. H.R. 6146, 110th Cong. (2008).
185. Id. § 2. Representative Steve Cohen, in his remarks in the House of Representatives,
indicated support for a further public hearing in 2009 for legislation that would "go further"
toward remedying libel tourism. 154 CONG. REc. H10,259 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008).
Representative Peter King also indicated that the bill was a "step in the right direction," and
he hoped to have further discussions during the next congressional session on additional
measures. Id. at H10,262.
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II. SHOULD PERSONAL JURISDICTION EXTEND VIA THE EFFECTS TEST TO
LIBEL TOURISTS?
Having discussed the policies and doctrine informing a personal
jurisdictional analysis in a libel tourism context, this Note turns to the
various arguments supporting and criticizing asserting personal jurisdiction
over alleged libel tourists. Part II first examines the various policies
supporting an extension of personal jurisdiction. It then examines the case
law from various circuits supporting an extension of the effects test to libel
tourists, with a discussion on the potential relevancy of Internet-based cases
and First Amendment considerations. It then examines the policy
arguments against such an extension before discussing the case law of
various courts favoring a more limited application of the effects test.
A. Arguments for Extending the Effects Test
Because obtainment of a foreign defamation judgment does not
necessitate the foreign party's physical entrance into the United States] 86 or
the engagement into a long-term relationship with a U.S. party, 187 U.S.
courts analyzing the possibility of jurisdiction over such a defendant have
generally discussed the possibility of applying variations of the effects test
initially articulated in Calder v. Jones. 188
1. Policy Implications
As a general matter, the Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot essentially
contended that "the right to retry the merits ... should be accorded in every
suit on judgments recovered in countries where our own judgments are not
given full effect." 189 In other words, parties against whom judgments have
been rendered in countries with laws substantially dissimilar to those of the
United States should be allowed to retry the suit on the merits in a U.S.
court. 190 The Court may also have been suggesting that judgments from
those countries that do not engage in reciprocity with the United States
186. See Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 832 (N.Y. 2007) (indicating a
foreign party's purported contacts with the forum state to be the sending of papers, letters,
and emails).
187. See id. at 836-37 (refusing to recognize the foreign party's individual acts as
availment of New York State law); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984) (articulating the standard for general jurisdiction).
188. See, e.g., Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at 838 (discussing the application of the Ninth
Circuit's variation on the effects test).
189. 159 U.S. 113, 234 (1895) (Fuller, J., dissenting) (interpreting the majority's
decision). See, e.g., Aaron Warshaw, Note, Uncertainty from Abroad: Rome II and the
Choice of Law for Defamation Claims, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 269, 289-90 (2006) (stating
that, while the principle of comity usually governs enforcement of foreign judgments, an
exception exists for foreign defamation actions due to First Amendment considerations).




warrant a separate adjudication in a U.S. court. 191 Regardless, to hale a
foreign party into the United States, the plaintiff will need personal
jurisdiction over him. 192
Nearly a century after the decision in Hilton v. Guyot, the Supreme Court
reviewed the "loosening" of personal jurisdiction requirements in response
to a technologically and socially evolving nation:
"As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between
the States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a
similar increase. At the same time, progress in communications and
transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less
burdensome. In response to these changes, the requirements for personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of




In other words, as technology changes, what constitutes an unreasonably
burdensome assertion of jurisdiction may change as well. With the Internet
assuming greater prominence each year, publishing material solely within
one forum like the United States may become increasingly difficult and
jurisdictional analysis may need to evolve accordingly. 194 For example,
while neither Rachel Ehrenfeld nor her publisher purportedly sought to
disseminate information specifically in England, the material became
available there through various other channels. 195 Perhaps following a
similar sentiment, many state legislatures are expanding their long-arm
statutes to reach to the full extent of due process. 196 Thus, as libel tourism
flourishes, some state legislatures are indicating a willingness to grant U.S.
citizens greater latitude to redress in their own states' claims against
nonresident defendants.197
191. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT prefatory note,
13 pt. II U.L.A. 5-6 (Supp. 2008) (encouraging, but not requiring, reciprocity).
192. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
193. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (quoting
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958)) (citing Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. 310;
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)).
194. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1202 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (stating that, because anyone can access a website intended to
reach only a specific country, "[i]n actual practice, however, national boundaries are highly
permeable"); Beauchamp, supra note 42, at 3145 (arguing that the Internet makes most
publications available throughout the world without regard to borders); Horowitz, supra note
19 (claiming that Bin Mahfouz had silenced many authors and publishers).
195. Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 833 n.3 (N.Y. 2007).
196. Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Shiv K. Kapoor, Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction for
the Twenty-First Century: A Case Study Reconceptualizing the Typical Long-Arm Statute to
Codify and Refine International Shoe After Its First Sixty Years, 3 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REv.
339, 345 n.7 (2007) (indicating that only eighteen states have statutes that do not extend to
the limits of due process).
197. See id. at 345.
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2. Circuits Broadening the Reach of the Effects Test
This section focuses on the particular courts that have broadly applied the
effects test. Following the historical expansion of personal jurisdiction
analysis under Calder v. Jones,198 the Ninth Circuit has developed the
broadest reading of the effects test among the federal circuit courts. 19 9
Under the test, personal jurisdiction exists over a defendant if he "(1)
committed an intentional act, which was (2) expressly aimed at the forum
state, and (3) caused harm, the brunt of which is suffered and which the
defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state. '200 The Ninth
Circuit recognized that mere foreseeability that an act would have an effect
in the forum is much too broad a proposition to confer jurisdiction.201
Rather, the court required that the defendant engage in "express aiming" or
"individualized targeting" of the subject forum.202 Specifically, in Bancroft
& Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National, Inc.,203 the court held that a Georgia
golf club's sending of a letter challenging a California organization's use of
a trademark and demanding that the organization cease and desist its use of
said trademark fulfilled the test's requirements. 204 However, scholars have
criticized the court for failing to explicitly define or explain its rationale in
applying "express aiming. '205  Additionally, in applying the concept,
subsequent courts tend not to explicitly rationalize the applicable principles
involved. 20 6 This is indeed a source of confusion, as the Ninth Circuit
appears to decide most of its personal jurisdiction cases purely with regard
to this one prong of targeting or aiming. 207
Regardless, the Ninth Circuit has expressly applied the effects test to
achieve personal jurisdiction over parties that have obtained court orders.
In Lake v. Lake,20 8 an attorney obtained an ex parte custody order for a
child's mother in California that removed custody from the father in
Idaho.209 The court held that Idaho "could properly exercise jurisdiction
over the defendant 'whose only 'contact' with the forum state is the
198. See supra Part I.B.2.d.
199. Singleton, supra note 145, at 928.
200. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.
2000).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1087-88. But see Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997)
(stating categorically that "the state in which the victim of a tort suffers the injury" will have
jurisdiction against the alleged tortfeasor).
203. 223 F.3d 1082.
204. Id. at 1088.
205. See Singleton, supra note 145, at 931 (criticizing the court for failing to provide "any
subsequent, meaningful guidance as to what 'express aiming' and its synonym, 'targeting'
mean").
206. Id.
207. Id. at 937.
208. 817 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1987).
209. Id. at 1419.
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'purposeful direction' of a foreign act having effect in the forum state.' ' 2 10
Thus, because it constituted a foreign act with intended effects in the forum
state of Idaho, the mother's obtainment of a foreign ex parte order was a
sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction.2 1'
Taking this analysis one step further, an en banc panel stated in Yahoo!
Inc. that its interpretation of the effects test does not require "that all (or
even any) jurisdictionally relevant effects have been caused by wrongful
acts." 21 2 Thus, the court applied the test to acts related to the enforcement
of a foreign judgment-namely, the sending of a cease and desist letter,
service of process, and the obtainment of interim orders against the U.S.
party.2 13 The court noted that each of the three enumerated types of action,
when considered in isolation, was insufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction.2 14 However, the court found that all of the aforementioned
actions considered together fulfilled the effects test.2 15 Specifically, it held
that the foreign party intentionally filed suit in a French court, that the suit
was expressly aimed at California, and that the interim orders required
significant acts to be performed by Yahoo! in California (even though the
desired effect would also be felt in France), thus fulfilling the "intentional
act" and "aiming" requirements. 2 16
The court conceded that the final prong-whether a harm had occurred in
California-was a close question.2 17  However, even though the foreign
parties had not sought to enforce the French court's orders in the United
States, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the mere existence of those
orders might hinder Yahoo!'s policies and actions 2 18 (as the district court
had revealed some uncertainty as to whether Yahoo! had complied
sufficiently with the orders).2 19 While the majority of the court did find
sufficient "effects" to warrant personal jurisdiction, the court ultimately
dismissed the case on separate grounds: the three votes of the judges voting
against finding personal jurisdiction combined with the three votes of those
210. Id. at 1423 (quoting Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, 784 F.2d
1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986)).
211. Id. However, in what may be seen as a limiting factor, the court also acknowledged
that the obtainment of the ex parte order was an allegedly tortious act. See id.
212. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1208
(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
213. Id. at 1208-10. The court also held that whether the harm was felt in another forum
is irrelevant-that the relevant consideration is whether "a jurisdictionally sufficient amount
of harm is suffered in the forum state." Id. at 1207. This holding has the practical effect of
making the test more broadly applicable. See Singleton, supra note 145, at 932 (suggesting
that the test is now "easier to meet").
214. Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1208.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1209.
217. Id. at 1211.
218. Id. at 1209.
219. Id. at 1205 (citing Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme,
169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001)).
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judges that did not believe the case was ripe.220 Specifically, the court held
that, because the French court's "interim" orders were subject to further
modification, their potential effects were not definite enough to allow the
court to decide whether they were repugnant to U.S. policy.221
Other circuits have similarly expanded the effects test's application
beyond intentional torts. According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Industries, Inc.,222 the test "is
not limited to torts but rather encompasses all cases in which 'the brunt of
the harm... was suffered in' the forum, and the forum 'is the focal point
both of the' defendant's actions 'and of the harm suffered.' ' 223 Thus, by
extending the effects test beyond intentional torts, the court avoided
characterizing as a tort an injunction ordered by another state. 224 Similarly,
according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Wallace v.
Herron,225 the Supreme Court "did not intend the Calder 'effects' test to
apply only to libel cases." 226 The Seventh Circuit proceeded to apply the
test to an alleged malicious prosecution.227
a. Internet Cases: A Possible Model for Jurisdiction over Libel Tourists
With the increasing prevalence of Internet commerce and the expanding
availability of published texts and information, some argue that courts'
interpretations of applicable long-arm statutes may need to become
sufficiently flexible to allow residents to redress grievances in their own
state courts. 228 Otherwise, as in the context of libel tourism, U.S. residents
may be unfairly excluded from invoking the laws of their own states. 229
220. Id. at 1224.
221. Id. at 1215, 1223-24. But see Beauchamp, supra note 42, at 3139 (arguing that
dismissing the case for lack of ripeness was the court's way of merely sidestepping the
difficult issues involved).
222. 326 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
223. Id. at 1205 n.4 (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984)).
224. See id. at 1205. But see infra Part II.B.3 (discussing other court opinions unwilling to
so extend the effects test).
225. 778 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1985).
226. Id. at 395. But see United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, 274 F.3d 610, 624 (1st Cir.
2001) (stating that whether the test was intended to apply beyond defamation torts is
unclear); IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 260 (3d Cir. 1998) (characterizing
the effects test as applying to intentional torts "to enhance otherwise insufficient contacts
with the forum"); infra Part II.B.3.
227. Wallace, 778 F.2d at 394. However, the court found insufficient contacts to warrant
personal jurisdiction under the facts of the case. Id.
228. See, e.g., Van Detta & Kapoor, supra note 196, at 380-81 (arguing that, unless
courts adopt a flexible standard for personal jurisdiction, the increasing number of cases
arising from e-commerce will hinder courts' abilities to resolve cases); see also Fischbarg v.
Doucet, 880 N.E.2d 22, 30 (N.Y. 2007) (holding that multiple telephone and electronic
communications between an attorney and client were sufficient contacts to constitute a
transaction of business under the applicable long-arm statute).
229. See Van Detta & Kapoor, supra note 196, at 431 (indicating that the inherent
limitations of long-arm statutes conflict with the desires of many states to exercise personal
jurisdiction to the fullest extent of due process). However, Professors Jeffrey Van Detta and
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This section does not discuss libel tourism per se. Rather it examines
several Internet-based cases and their potentially relevant jurisdictional
analyses. Because jurisdictional analyses regarding Internet offenses (i.e.,
technological acts physically performed in one forum with potentially
significant effects in another) often apply variants of the effects test, they
may be relevantly analogous to libel tourism cases (i.e., cases in which a
party may enter a forum via legal actions taken in another country).230 This
section details a sampling of such Internet cases.
In a case like Peridyne Technology Solutions v. Matheson Fast Freight,
Inc.,231 in which an employee of the defendant corporation allegedly hacked
into the plaintiffs computer system in Georgia, 232 the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia upheld personal jurisdiction under a
long-arm statute reaching to the full extent of due process. 233 In doing so,
the court quoted the Ninth Circuit, noting that the defendants "'should not
be permitted to take advantage of modern technology' via the Internet or
other electronic means to 'escape traditional notions of jurisdiction.' ' 234
In Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,235 the Ninth Circuit held
that registering an Internet domain name as part of a scheme to extort
money from the an out-of-state trademark holder was sufficient contact
under the effects test to warrant personal jurisdiction.236  The court
indicated that the defendant's "scheme" to extort money from the plaintiff
was adequate to fulfill the "express aiming" requirement.237 Thus, the court
extended the effects test to the "relatively new" arena of cyberspace. 238
The court indicated that this was a reasonable extension of the doctrine first
espoused in Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football
Club, L.P.,239 wherein the Seventh Circuit found that the broadcasting of a
trademark via national television was sufficient entry into the state of
Indiana to qualify under one of the prongs of the effects test. 240 Thus, the
Shiv Kapoor propose that the solution lies in reforming long-arm statutes themselves, rather
than relying on various inconsistent interpretations of restrictive statutes among the courts.
Id. at 433.
230. For example, in a paradigmatic libel tourism case like Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant essentially entered or affected the forum via a "'foreign
litigation scheme."' 881 N.E.2d 830, 834 (N.Y. 2007).
231. 117 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
232. Id. at 1369.
233. Id. at 1369, 1372.
234. Id. at 1371 (quoting Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir.
1997)). Notably, the court in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. held that the mere posting of a
"passive" website, absent additional activities, was inadequate to warrant personal
jurisdiction. 130 F.3d at 420.
235. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
236. Id. at 1322.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1320.
239. 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994).
240. Id. at 411-12. More recent cases have applied similar analyses to Internet-related
"entries" into a forum. See, e.g., Miller v. McEachern, No. 3:07-CV-1997-M, 2008 WL
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Ninth Circuit appears to facilitate not just an explicit expansion of the
effects test but perhaps a general broadening of the minimum requirements
for entry into a forum.
b. First Amendment Considerations
This section discusses another potentially relevant consideration in the
jurisdictional analysis: the gravity of First Amendment concerns arising
from foreign defamation judgments. Just as the effects test's application to
Internet-based offenses may suggest its applicability to foreign defamation
judgments, First Amendment concerns arising from an unenforced foreign
defamation judgment may prove relevant if deemed to produce a
jurisdictionally sufficient "effect."
The particular gravity of defending First Amendment rights against
foreign judgments has inspired some to call for broader protection of U.S.
speech from libel tourists. For example, New York State's Libel Terrorism
Protection Act was recently criticized as underinclusive. The chief
criticism was that, due to the importance of broadly protecting First
Amendment rights, the Act should require mandatory nonrecognition of not
just qualifying defamation judgments but "all foreign judgments impinging
on rights protected by the freedom of speech. '241 A case like Telnikoff v.
Matusevitch242 underscores this argument. When a foreign plaintiff sought
to enforce a defamation judgment obtained in England against a Maryland
resident, the Court of Appeals of Maryland emphasized the wide-reaching
implications of First Amendment infringements via foreign judgments,
stating that "recognition of English defamation judgments could well lead
to wholesale circumvention of fundamental public policy in Maryland and
the rest of the country. '243
Thus, if a court found the chilling effects of an unenforced foreign
defamation judgment to be analogous to those of an enforced English
defamation judgment, 244 a comparable circumvention of (or "effect" upon)
First Amendment rights might occur absent personal jurisdiction.245
Additionally, Aaron Warshaw argues that, while the principle of comity
usually governs enforcement of foreign judgments, an exception exists for
4131725, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2008) (finding that a defendant's alleged entry into a state
via Internet-access of a discrete software program was adequate to confer jurisdiction under
the effects test).
241. Mondora, supra note 104, at 1170.
242. 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).
243. Id. at 250.
244. See id. (highlighting the potential gravity of enforcing foreign defamation
judgments). Courts have yet to reach a consensus on this. See supra notes 85-90 and
accompanying text.
245. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1253 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing




foreign defamation actions due to the gravity of First Amendment
considerations. 246  In other words, the gravity of First Amendment
considerations may be sufficient to carve out an exception to the general
policies surrounding enforcement of foreign judgments, 247 including the
question of whether to assert personal jurisdiction over the foreign party.248
The First Amendment is also an important consideration in determining a
case's ripeness for adjudication. 249 Just as a court may be more likely to
find a case "ripe" if it involves First Amendment infringements, 250 so may
it be more likely to find a cognizable "effect" for personal jurisdictional
analyses. For example, if a court establishes that a law affects a U.S.
party's First Amendment rights, the court should determine the extent of
that effect by considering both the costs of litigation and the ever-growing
liability that an author or publisher faces by publicizing an article. 251 Thus,
because a foreign defamation judgment has potentially broader
consequences than a mere compulsion to show up in court, the judgment
may have a heightened cognizable effect for jurisdictional purposes. 252
However, a notable criticism of this approach is that it risks conflating
substantive issues of enforcement policy with procedural issues of personal
jurisdiction.253
B. Arguments to Limit the Application of the Effects Test
Part II has thus far discussed the various policy and doctrinal arguments
for extending personal jurisdiction over foreign parties that obtain
defamation judgments in foreign courts. This section now turns to those
policy and doctrinal arguments opposing an extension of personal
jurisdiction.
246. Warshaw, supra note 189, at 289-90.
247. See Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 518 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2008) (indicating that "the
freedom of speech implications of the case ... compelled certification of the jurisdictional
issue to the New York Court of Appeals"); Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 249 (finding a foreign
defamation judgment repugnant to public policy).
248. 44B Am. JuR. 2D International Law § 8 (2007) (indicating that, if two sovereignties
have adequate jurisdiction, comity usually counsels one nation to forbear from asserting
jurisdiction).
249. In Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Co., the Supreme Court explained
that, for a court to rule on a dispute, "[t]he disagreement must not be nebulous or contingent
but must have taken on fixed and final shape so that a court can see what legal issues it is
deciding, what effect its decision will have on the adversaries, and some useful purpose to be
achieved in deciding them." 344 U.S. 237, 244 (1952).
250. See Beauchamp, supra note 42, at 3139-41 (arguing that the general chilling effect
of a foreign defamation lawsuit should be a sufficient basis for a court to find a suit ripe).
251. Id.
252. See id. at 3139-40.




1. The "Myth" of Libel Tourism
Not all agree that libel tourism is an issue that U.S. courts should even
address. John Walsh argues that, by ruling on the domestic enforceability
of foreign defamation judgments, U.S. courts are overextending the reach of
the First Amendment and essentially creating "rules for the jurisprudence of
other countries" in stark defiance of international legal principles. 2 54
According to Walsh, Rachel Ehrenfeld's decision to sue in a U.S. court
implicates troubling questions about the reach of U.S. law and its ability to
render binding judgments on foreign nationals. 255 He further criticizes
Ehrenfeld's approach (having a U.S. court apply U.S. law to an arguably
foreign controversy) as an outdated "protectionist" strategy that cannot keep
pace with the "speed and reach" of the Internet.256 He concludes that such
a strategy undermines the policies of comity that are necessary for strong
international relations at a time when the United States needs them most.257
Similar critiques have been levied at the Libel Terrorism Protection Act
for creating an unconstitutional extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction.258
Specifically, Thomas Gleason argues that the Act appears to extend
jurisdiction over "cases in which publication also occurred in the foreign
forum, where [a] foreign person without New York contacts may have been
damaged. ' 259 In other words, even though such a statute requires the action
to arise out of publication occurring in New York State, it may still
overextend jurisdiction based upon actual effects (publication and harm to
reputation) in foreign forums. 260  Gleason also criticizes the Act for
promoting parochialism-addressing only New York State parties on a
254. John J. Walsh, The Myth of 'Libel Tourism,' N.Y. L.J., Nov. 20, 2007, at 2.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. In a similar vein, an article written by Professor Craig A. Stem in 1994
condemned the ruling in Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661,
665 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (refusing to enforce a foreign defamation action), as "provincialism by
universalization"; in other words, the court unjustifiably broadened the reach of the First
Amendment into a "universal declaration of human rights" applicable beyond the boundaries
of the United States. Craig A. Stem, Foreign Judgments and the Freedom of Speech: Look
Who's Talking, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 999, 1036 (1994). However, Professor Stem was
specifically addressing the court's analysis of the repugnancy of the foreign judgment to
U.S. public policy, not ajurisdictional analysis. See id. at 1035-36.
258. See Thomas F. Gleason, New York Practice: Who Should Fix the Libel Tourism
Problem?, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 17, 2008, at 3 (calling the Act "problematic on constitutional
grounds").
259. Id.
260. Id. For example, Judge Warren Ferguson in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le
Racisme et l'Antisemitisme argued that the French court only sought to limit French users'
access in France to Yahoo!'s objectionable material. 433 F.3d 1199, 1225 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (Ferguson, J., concurring). But see Paul H. Aloe, Outside Counsel: Unraveling Libel
Terrorism, N.Y. L.J., June 18, 2008, at 4 (suggesting that the intent of the Act was that the
publication's "nexus to New York should be construed to be substantial" to invoke
jurisdiction under the statute).
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national issue.261 Others have criticized House Bill 6146,262 as making
people more vulnerable to defamation. 263
Dovetailing with these arguments is another possibility that, perhaps, the
solution does not lie within the courts themselves. With regard to
regulating speech proliferated via the Internet, Gregory S. Cooper argues
that employing geographic Internet filtering tools may be a more preferable
tactic than expanding the scope of U.S. adjudication. 264 He concedes that
the approach of the Ninth Circuit in the Yahoo! litigation is advantageous in
that it provides consistency-dividing speech enforcement of Internet-based
expression into theoretical "zones" or territories allows a country to apply
its own constitutional limitations. 265  However, he contends that this
approach may encourage U.S. courts to erroneously conflate the separate
issues of speech directed domestically and speech directed abroad, leading
to unnecessarily expansive U.S. jurisdiction.266 Cooper argues that a better
alternative exists: limiting the geographical locations that can actually
access Internet-proliferated speech would limit the "spillover effects" and
significantly reduce any chilling effects on U.S. speech.267
2. Underlying Policy Rationales
Having discussed various major critiques of extending personal
jurisdiction, this section turns to two additional relevant policy
considerations. Specifically examined are the potential that U.S. judgments
may be unenforceable in foreign courts (for lack of reciprocity or comity)
and the potential misapplication of First Amendment considerations to
personal jurisdictional analysis.
261. Gleason, supra note 258.
262. See H.R. 6146, i 10th Cong. (2008).
263. Carol Coulter, Irish Solicitor Campaigns Against Effects of U.S. Bill on Libel
Awards, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 17, 2008, at 4 (reporting that a Belfast solicitor, who was
prepared to sue the National Enquirer and gossip magazines, claimed the bill "would make
people more vulnerable to defamation").
264. Gregory S. Cooper, Note, A Tangled Web We Weave: Enforcing International
Speech Restrictions in an Online World, 8 U. PiTr. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 2, 3-4, 21 (2007).
265. Id. at 20.
266. Id. at 21. Gregory S. Cooper suggests that the courts in Bachchan v. India Abroad
Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992), Telnikoff v. Matusevich, 702 A.2d 230
(Md. 1997), and Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d
1199 (9th Cir. 2006), unnecessarily conflated these issues without offering any support why
speech directed abroad should fall under the control of the First Amendment. Cooper, supra
note 264, at 21.
267. Cooper, supra note 264, at 21. In support of his argument, Cooper also notes that a
majority of Internet traffic originates outside of the United States. Id. at 24. The technical




a. The Conflict of U.S. Judgments with Those of Foreign Courts
Underlying Walsh and Cooper's arguments is the concept of reciprocity
in foreign recognition of U.S. judgments. In other words, foreign laws may
severely limit the effectiveness beyond U.S. borders of U.S. jurisdictional
assertions and judgments over foreign parties. This section details how
such considerations may counsel against a broad assertion of personal
jurisdiction.
In assessing whether to enforce a judgment, a court, including courts in
foreign countries, may consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction was
appropriate according to its own forum's law. 268 While some countries like
Italy, England, and Canada have rejected a reciprocity requirement,
countries like Germany and Austria still require it. 269 Most countries
located in Western Europe have accepted an effects-like test with regard to
economic effects, with various interpretations from country to country.270
Deviation from these countries' jurisdictional laws may mean that U.S.
assertions of jurisdiction will not be recognized abroad. 271 Thus, the limbo
of conflicting judgments between foreign countries may threaten to
fragment a party's rights as he may remain vulnerable to enforcement of the
judgment if he travels outside the United States. 272
Additionally, England allows only a limited number of ways in which a
foreign court can exercise personal jurisdiction over its citizens and have
the ensuing judgment be recognizable in English courts. 273 The Southern
District of New York took these factors into consideration in Dow Jones &
Co. v. Harrods, Ltd. Dow Jones published an article comparing Harrods to
Enron 274 and accused the company of "messing around with the facts" in
order to create a potentially misleading April Fool's joke in the form of a
fake press release. 275 Harrods filed a defamation lawsuit in an English
court against Dow Jones.276 In response to the threat of litigation, Dow
Jones filed for declaratory relief in New York,277 seeking declarations that
Harrods could not meet its burden of proving falsity 278 or its burden of
proving fault.279 However, the court indicated that such a declaratory
268. See Silberman, supra note 98, at 254-59.
269. Id. at 260-61.
270. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
reporters' note 3 (1987).
271. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
272. See Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd., 237 F. Supp. 2d 394, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
ajfd, 346 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2003) (indicating a U.S. adjudication will not overturn a foreign
judgment).
273. Silberman, supra note 98, at 256.
274. 237 F. Supp. 2d 394, 400-01, affd, 346 F.3d 357.
275. Id. at 400 n.5, 401.
276. Id. at 402.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 403 (arguing "that Harrods could not prove that Dow Jones acted with actual
malice or gross irresponsibility").
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judgment "may not be entitled to recognition or enforcement in the United
Kingdom" because an English court may consider it contrary to public
policy, thus exacerbating the uncertainty of the judgment's effect. 280 For
example, while a U.S. court may adjudicate the rights of a party within U.S.
borders, its judgment may have no effect upon that party's rights once he
physically steps outside U.S. borders, unless the relevant foreign territory
sees fit to recognize the judgment.281 Given these considerations, the court
remained reluctant to exercise what it characterized as "a preemptive style
of global jurisdiction" that would merely purport to "strike down offending
litigation anywhere on Earth. 282
b. First Amendment Considerations May Not Apply to Personal
Jurisdiction Analysis
This section details the arguments that the First Amendment should
remain irrelevant to jurisdictional analyses. The Court in Calder v. Jones
explicitly prohibited allowing substantive defamation considerations into
the personal jurisdictional analysis. 283 It explained that, because the suit
would inevitably be jurisdictionally appropriate in a U.S. court, the
substantive laws of that forum (applying the federal laws of the
Constitution) would consider any applicable First Amendment principles. 284
Thus, by rejecting First Amendment considerations as part of a
jurisdictional analysis, the Court avoided what it called needless "double
counting." 285 The Court similarly denied considering First Amendment
principles as part of the jurisdictional analysis in Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc.,286 "categorically" rejecting "the suggestion that invisible
radiations from the First Amendment may defeat jurisdiction otherwise
proper under the Due Process Clause." 287  In doing so, the Court
emphasized the necessity of drawing boundaries in much the same way the
court in Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd. did in refusing to drastically
expand personal jurisdiction (and implicitly, the reach of the First
Amendment) to foreign forums.288
Finally, the Supreme Court has, in other contexts, discounted the idea
that a law offends the First Amendment "simply because [its] enforcement
against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news." 289 Just as the First Amendment does not grant such "limitless
280. Id. at 413.
281. See, e.g., id.
282. Id. at411.
283. 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984).
284. See id.
285. Id. at 790.
286. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
287. Id. at 780 n.12.
288. See 237 F. Supp. 2d 394, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd, 346 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2003).
289. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
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protection,"2 90 neither may it warrant extending jurisdiction and rendering
foreign judgments unenforceable for such reasons. 29 1
3. Doctrinal Arguments to Limit the Effects Test
Having discussed various policy arguments against extending personal
jurisdiction in a libel tourism context, this Note now details the various
doctrinal arguments supporting a narrow application of the existing effects
test doctrine. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the loosening of
personal jurisdiction requirements in light of technological advances did not
."herald[] the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal
jurisdiction"' requirement. 292 Following this rationale, some courts have
applied the effects test quite narrowly.
In 2006, the Supreme Court of Alabama stated that the effects test "has
been limited to intentional-tort cases." 293  Following in this line of
reasoning, Judge O'Scannlain, in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le
Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, indicated that "[tjhe Supreme Court has never
approved such a radical extension of personal jurisdiction... that, by
litigating a bona fide claim in a foreign court and receiving a favorable
judgment, a foreign party automatically assents to being haled into court in
the other litigant's home forum." 294 According to Judge O'Scannlain, the
effects test has never applied beyond commercial and contract cases, and
requires a wrongful act.29 5  Accordingly, its application to foreign
judgments would be unwarranted.296
Taking a slightly different tack, Judge Ferguson argued that, while the
effects test is applicable to a foreign judgment, the requested remedy or
"effect" (preventing access to the objectionable material in France) was
localized only in France. 297 Consistent with this conclusion was that the
290. Id. at 671.
291. See Gleason, supra note 258.
292. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (quoting
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958)).
293. Exparte Gregory, 947 So. 2d 385, 394 (Ala. 2006) (citations omitted); see Revell v.
Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2002) (characterizing the effects test as one "for
intentional torts"); Triple Diamond Energy Corp. v. Venture Research Inst., Inc., No. 3:08-
CV-0050-M ECF, 2008 WL 2620352, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2008) (listing the commission
of an intentional tort as one of the requirements of the effects test as applied by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit); Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2, 7-8 (Cal.
2002) (citing IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259-60, 261 (3d Cir. 1998); Far
W. Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1077 (10th Cir. 1995)) (indicating that courts have
applied the effects test to intentional torts, including business torts).
294. 433 F.3d 1199, 1229 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring). See,
e.g., Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 91-92 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the
unauthorized placement of plaintiff's likeness onto a French advertising campaign did not
warrant jurisdiction as it "would inappropriately credit random, isolated, or fortuitous
contacts and negate the reason for the purposeful availment requirement").
295. Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1230-31 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
296. Id. at 1231.
297. Id. at 1225 (Ferguson, J., concurring).
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foreign parties had not sought to enforce the judgment in the United
States.298 According to the judge, this localized effect, combined with
France's compelling interest in preventing access to the material, warranted
the U.S. court's abstention from adjudication. 299
In a broader conclusion, Judge Tashima argued that the mere filing of a
lawsuit in a foreign forum is never a sufficient basis from which to exercise
personal jurisdiction and that doing so would unduly extend personal
jurisdiction every time a foreign party was named in a lawsuit. 300
Specifically, Judge Tashima concluded that orders sent by a foreign court
are not acts by the foreign party itself and, thus, can never be sufficient
"contacts." 30 1  Filing suit in one country is thus insufficient to confer
jurisdiction in another country.30 2 To hold otherwise, the judge said, means
every judgment against a foreign defendant will have an "effect" in the
defendant's home country, opening the door for foreign countries to
interfere with the obligation of a court to uphold its own country's domestic
laws and policies. 303 Thus, a proposed expansion of the effects test faces
significant resistance, whether the argument is that the test is never
applicable to foreign judgments304 or is just easily subverted to the
localized "effects" and obligations of a foreign court. 30 5
III. ADVOCATING A NARROW PERSONAL JURISDICTION PROVISION FOR
LIBEL TOURISM
Part I of this Note discussed the growing trend of libel tourism and the
various policies and statutes related to the recognition of foreign judgments
in the United States. It concluded with a summary of the development of
personal jurisdiction doctrine in the United States. Part II presented several
policy and doctrinal arguments for and against extending personal
jurisdiction over libel tourists. Part III advocates the constitutionality and
practicality of a federal statute granting personal jurisdiction over libel
tourists under limited circumstances. Practically, such a statute would
prevent chilling effects upon protected speech by guaranteeing the U.S.
party a chance to avail himself of the protections of U.S. law, a guarantee
that does not currently exist under a system of various disparate state long-
arm statutes. Furthermore, with international policy and comity in mind,
the effects test would be applicable to the foreign judgments not as
intentional torts but as an extension of the doctrine under heightened First
Amendment principles. While, admittedly, this solution may result in
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1227-28.
300. Id. at 1232-33 (Tashima, J., concurring).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1233.
304. See id.
305. See id. at 1227-28 (Ferguson, J., concurring).
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conflicting and potentially unenforceable judgments between countries, it
will allow U.S. parties to operate with greater legal certainty with regard to
the heightened and unique concerns of First Amendment rights until an
international jurisdictional consensus develops.
A. Practicality: Protecting U.S. Parties
This section details the practical importance of allowing personal
jurisdiction over libel tourists. As articulated in Cybersell, Inc. v.
Cybersell, Inc.,306 defendants "'should not be permitted to take advantage
of modem technology' via the Internet or other electronic means to
"'escape traditional notions of jurisdiction.' 30 7 Similarly, a foreign party
should not be allowed to circumvent traditional notions of jurisdiction as
extensive e-commerce blurs the practical boundaries of state sovereignty. 30 8
Just as causes of action may arise via Internet-related activities, so may U.S.
parties be subject to personal jurisdiction in foreign forums as an indirect
result of Internet-proliferated activity. 309 U.S. parties must be able to
invoke their own forum's laws to protect themselves against the reality that,
in an Internet age, information is likely to proliferate beyond its targeted
forum.3
10
A federal statute would promote uniformity and avoid some of the
critiques of provincialism levied at the New York statute. 311 As previously
mentioned, the 2008 Free Speech Protection Act's proposed jurisdictional
provision, which would confer personal jurisdiction over a party that files a
defamation lawsuit in a foreign court, is a step in the right direction. 312
However, in order not to overstep international obligations of comity, a
preferable provision would be to grant personal jurisdiction only if a
judgment had been obtained. 313 Such a provision would give the U.S. party
the option of defending in the foreign forum 314 or defaulting and suing for
unenforceability in the United States.315 Thus, such a provision would
combat certain practical chilling effects upon a U.S. party-allowing him to
306. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
307. Id. at 419 (quoting EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. Basis Int'l, Ltd., 947 F. Supp.
413, 420 (D. Ariz. 1996)).
308. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
311. See Gleason, supra note 258 (advocating a federal approach or international treaty in
lieu of the Libel Terrorism Protection Act).
312. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text; see also supra note 185 and
accompanying text.
313. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; infra Part III.C (discussing issues of
comity and international policy).
314. By requiring a judgment of some kind, the statute would likely foster a practice more
deferential to a foreign forum's sovereignty than would a practice that essentially prejudges
any litigation. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (intending comity to foster
friendliness between nations); supra note 102 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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ascertain the extent of his liability instead of haphazardly self-censoring
absent an express adjudication. 316 The federal nature of such a statute
would also address criticisms levied at New York State's statute as
promoting parochialism. 317  Instead, the statute's national applicability
would ensure a comprehensive federal policy to promote uniformity among
the courts. 318
B. Constitutionality
This section argues that both (1) the substantial case law broadly
construing the effects test 319 and (2) the gravity of First Amendment
considerations 320 warrant the constitutionality of a narrowly drafted federal
statute with language similar to that of the Libel Terrorism Protection
Act. 321 Specifically advocated is a statute that provides a federal cause of
action for a declaratory judgment for any U.S. party against whom a
defamation judgment is obtained in a foreign court-essentially, a
modification of a provision in the Free Speech Protection Act.322 However,
as mentioned previously, the provision advocated herein would be
narrower, allowing personal jurisdiction and a cause of action only if the
foreign party had first obtained a judgment.323 Additionally, the cause of
action would be for a declaratory judgment only, not damages. 324
1. A Dire Need to Gradually Expand Minimum Contacts Analysis on a
Limited Basis
The historic expansion of minimum contacts analysis over time in
response to changing technology 325 and the current case law expanding the
use of the effects test to apply to foreign defamation judgments (or, at least,
foreign court orders) 326 and Internet-related activity327 underscore a need
for an application of the effects test to the growing trend of libel tourism. 328
U.S. courts should respond to the expanding dissemination of published
316. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
319. See supra Part II.A.2.
320. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
321. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
322. See Free Speech Protection Act of 2008, S. 2977, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2008)
(providing a federal cause of action).
323. See id. § 3(b) (providing jurisdiction merely for the filing of a foreign defamation
lawsuit).
324. While allowing a U.S. party to sue for damages, see id. § 3(c)(2), may be prudent if
the foreign party attempts to enforce the judgment in the United States, it seems a blatant
contradiction of comity to demand money damages from a party only for availing itself of a
particular forum's laws. See supra notes 128, 303 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
327. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
328. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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texts and information (via the author's volition or third-party action) by
allowing residents to redress grievances in their own court system.329
Otherwise, U.S. residents may be unfairly excluded from invoking the laws
of their home forum.330 Admittedly, a so-called "libel tourist" may also
merely be invoking the laws of his own forum to protect his local
reputation. 331 However, if a party can obtain jurisdiction in England over a
U.S. party when the U.S. party never intended or made efforts to make a
work available there,332 comity does not require a U.S. court to stand idly
by.333
The U.S. Supreme Court should interpret the effects test to allow
personal jurisdiction when a foreign party obtains a foreign defamation
judgment (by default or otherwise) over a U.S. party protected under the
First Amendment, resulting in sufficient harm 334 to the U.S. party's
protected speech rights in the United States. 335  Foreign defamation
judgments are distinct from foreign judgments in general: their mere
existence may limit a U.S. party's actions in its home forum, limiting its
willingness to speak or publish openly in related and potentially unrelated
matters for fear of further retribution.336
Despite some disagreement among circuit courts, circuits have certainly
found it necessary to apply the effects test beyond the scope of intentional
torts.337 Thus, even absent the dire need to extend the test in the libel
tourism context, basing jurisdiction on whether an effect was harmful or
tortious makes little judicial sense-a holding on the merits that the effect
was not, in fact, harmful would then deprive a court of jurisdiction.338
Additionally, analogizing the obtainment of a judgment in a foreign court to
an activity that "enters" the United States is not a great doctrinal leap from
pre-existing case law considering Internet-related activity339 or court orders
from other U.S. jurisdictions340 as sufficient entry into a forum.
Thus, a test similar to the Ninth Circuit's (requiring that a defendant (1)
committed an intentional act (obtaining a foreign defamation judgment), (2)
expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused a "sufficient" harm there
329. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
331. See Walsh, supra note 254.
332. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
334. See infra notes 353-54.
335. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(d) (McKinney Supp. 2009) (granting "personal jurisdiction
over any person who obtains a judgment in a defamation proceeding outside the United
States" subject to several limitations).
336. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1251-53 (9th Cir. 2006) (en bane) (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 833 n.3 (N.Y. 2007); supra Part I.A.3.
337. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
338. See Yahoo! Inc.,433 F.3dat 1208.
339. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998).
340. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
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that the defendant knows is likely to occur) seems appropriate. 341 As in
Yahoo! Inc., ascertaining whether sufficient harm exists in the United States
will be the most difficult question to resolve in such cases. 342 However, the
difficulty of this question should not warrant a wholesale ban on extending
the effects test. Rather, it would serve as a limiting factor, requiring a
sufficient fact-specific quantum of harm within the United States in each
case. 343 While this may undercut some of the certainty of the test, a limit
must be drawn somewhere to comport with due process.
The test would make explicit that it allows jurisdiction insofar as a harm
or "chilling effect" exists in the United States. 344 A case like Ehrenfeld-
wherein the U.S. party published within her home forum (New York State)
and did not, of her own volition, disseminate the material in England-
clearly indicates that the foreign judgment will hinder the U.S. party's
dissemination of the material within the United States. 345  The
quintessential scenario likely falling entirely outside U.S. jurisdiction is
where a U.S. party publishes a work solely in a foreign forum and another
party obtains a defamation judgment in that forum. In such a scenario, any
"effect" upon a U.S. party's ability to write and publish freely in the United
States is dubious at best,346 and exercising jurisdiction would indeed be an
unwarranted and parochial extension of the First Amendment via personal
jurisdiction.347  In less categorical cases, factors indicating sufficient
chilling effects in the United States include the U.S. party's considerable
dissemination of the work in the United States and the extent to which the
foreign judgment is final (i.e., it is not merely in the process of
litigation).348 Regarding publication, for example, merely being able to
access from the United States a work published on the Internet, absent
additional distribution, would not constitute a sufficient nexus. 349
Thus, the above extension would be narrow enough to avoid facilitating
overly expansive jurisdiction, a concern of many courts declining to
interpret the effects test broadly.350  While the complete effect of the
judgment need not fall entirely within U.S. borders (just a sufficiently
341. See supra notes 199-200, 213 and accompanying text.
342. See Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1211 (indicating that whether a harm occurred in
California was a close question, but finding a sufficient quantum to qualify under due
process).
343. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
344. See Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1208 (wrongful act not necessary); Bancroft & Masters,
Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (articulating the express
aiming requirement); Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 834 (N.Y. 2007) (claiming
chilling effects on the ability to publish and write freely as a result of foreign litigation).
345. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 301-03 and accompanying text.
347. See Stem, supra note 257, at 1036.
348. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
349. See Aloe, supra note 260.
350. See Walsh, supra note 254 (criticizing extraterritorial extensions of U.S.
jurisdiction); supra Part II.B.3.
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cognizable amount),35' a court may still invoke forum non conveniens to
dismiss the case if it finds any chilling effects to be de minimis in relation
to the foreign forum's much greater interest in adjudication. 352 In making
this determination, a court may find a useful guide in mirror-image
jurisdiction: if the foreign court's basis for asserting jurisdiction would be
sufficient in the adjudicating U.S. court, the U.S. court may want to defer to
the other forum's cognizable interest. 353 Conversely, if the foreign court's
jurisdictional basis would not pass muster in the United States, that forum's
interest would be significantly less cognizable, allowing a U.S. court greater
latitude to hear the case without overstepping constitutional bounds. 354
2. The Gravity of First Amendment Concerns and the Permeable
Boundaries of the Internet
Unlike in Calder v. Jones, which dealt with personal jurisdictional issues
exclusively within the national boundaries of the United States, 355 First
Amendment considerations should play some role in the jurisdictional
analysis in foreign judgment defamation cases. As the reach of the
Constitution does not extend beyond the borders of the United States, the
equivalent protections of First Amendment rights are not guaranteed in
foreign forums. 356 Thus, injecting First Amendment considerations into
personal jurisdiction analysis would not constitute needless "double
counting" as it did in Calder.357 Just as in Telnikoffv. Matusevitch, wherein
the enforcement of a foreign defamation judgment that was repugnant to
public policy would have fostered a complete circumvention of First
Amendment rights,358 a U.S. court's failure to exercise jurisdiction over a
party that obtained a foreign defamation judgment could practically
discourage the U.S. party from freely exercising his First Amendment
rights.359 At the very least, U.S. publishers and authors would operate
hesitantly given the uncertainty of their nonadjudicated rights absent a
jurisdictional assertion. 360
Again, the Ninth Circuit in Yahoo! Inc. indicated some disagreement as
to the extent of the chilling effect incurred by interim orders. 361 However,
such disagreements will inevitably need weighing on a case-by-case
351. See supra note 213.
352. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
353. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
356. See supra Part I.A.2.
357. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984); supra notes 244-45 and
accompanying text.
358. 702 A.2d 230, 250 (Md. 1997).
359. See supra Part I.A.3.
360. See Beauchamp, supra note 42, at 3139-40 (indicating chilling effects even prior to
a judgment).
361. See supra notes 85-90.
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basis.362 While not a policy explicitly adopted by courts, if the gravity of
First Amendment concerns can make an otherwise nebulous dispute ripe,363
it might also render an otherwise nebulous "effect" (obtaining a foreign
judgment) into a more cognizable one for the sake of jurisdictional
analysis. 364 Thus, for the sake of certainty, perhaps courts should err on the
side of finding jurisdiction so that the U.S. party can at least avail itself of
its constitutional rights. The court, if finding the harm too attenuated, may
always dismiss on other grounds. 365
3. Narrow Drafting: Limiting the Scope
A narrow drafting of the statute would avoid unwarranted statutory
expansion of jurisdiction beyond defamation cases. The New York State
long-arm statute is a good model in that it fulfills most of these
requirements: It grants power only (1) "for the purposes of rendering
declaratory relief' if (2) a party had obtained a judgment "in a defamation
proceeding outside the United States" with respect to "a resident of New
York" or an "entity amenable to jurisdiction in New York who has assets in
New York or may have to take actions in New York to comply with the
judgment. '366 It also requires that the publication at issue have been
published in New York.367  Thus, the provision provides a baseline
statutory requirement that the publication have occurred in a U.S. forum to
which the due process analysis previously advocated herein 368 would
extend to ensure such a domestic dissemination was not merely de
minimis. 369 While the language might be read to confer unwarranted
jurisdiction over a foreign party without U.S. contacts that has actually been
damaged, 370 the narrow application of the effects test previously advocated
herein 371 would not allow a constitutional extension of personal jurisdiction
if an insufficient effect occurred in the United States (i.e., because a U.S.
party did not publish sufficiently in the United States, its U.S. activities
would not be chilled). Also, as addressed in the next section, a U.S. court's
declaration of a foreign judgment as unenforceable in the United States
does not in any way overturn the foreign judgment. 372
362. See supra Part 1II.B. 1.
363. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 250 and accompanying text. The disagreement among the judges in
Yahoo! Inc. regarding the extent of effects for jurisdiction and ripeness, see supra notes 85-
90, may indicate a doctrinal overlap. See supra note 221.
365. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
366. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(d) (McKinney Supp. 2009).
367. Id. § 302(d)(1).
368. See supra notes 341-44 and accompanying text.
369. Such provisions provide a kind of due process threshold. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 cmt.
17.
370. See Gleason, supra note 258.
371. See supra notes 341-44, 350-54 and accompanying text.
372. See infra Part III.C.
2009] 3247
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Adopting this language on a federal level, and granting a federal cause of
action, 373 would promote certainty through uniformity and help dispel the
practical chilling effects of foreign defamation judgments upon U.S. parties.
C. International Policy
Extending the effects test beyond tortious activities with the additional
rationale that such judgments warrant heightened First Amendment
considerations avoids necessarily castigating foreign judgments as
"tortious" or "wrongful harms," facilitating international relations that the
general principle of comity is intended to achieve. 374 Consistent with these
principles, by granting personal jurisdiction for obtainment of a judgment
(rather than for mere filing of a suit), appearing to litigate in the foreign
forum remains a viable option. 375 U.S. courts would not categorically
preempt the jurisdictional validity of foreign courts, thus upholding the
general principles of comity in international enforcement of law.376
Of course, this Note's proposals do not constitute a complete solution,
but merely another step in the proper direction. A notable criticism of this
approach is that it potentially leaves the parties with two contradictory
judgments (one within U.S sovereignty and another abroad), leaving the
U.S. party vulnerable to service of process for enforcement if he chooses to
travel outside U.S. jurisdictional boundaries. 377 In Ehrenfeld, the U.S. court
highlighted that its ruling may not "have any effect on the practice of libel
law in England. '378  Such criticism is duly noted. However, absent an
international consensus on jurisdiction regarding unenforced foreign
defamation judgments, the most the United States can do is protect its
citizens within its own borders without unduly interfering with foreign
sovereignties. Given the legal variations between countries, 379 the different
standards used to enforce judgments from other nations, 380 and the resulting
373. See Free Speech Protection Act of 2008, S. 2977, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2008).
374. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
375. See Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 832-33 (N.Y. 2007) (choosing to
default in a foreign defamation suit). Also, providing preemptive jurisdiction may effect a
similar result to mandatory nonenforcement, undercutting the deference to foreign
adjudication that Congress has sought to create. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying
text.
376. See supra Part I.A.4.
377. See supra notes 271-72. A viable alternative or (perhaps) complimentary solution
might involve seeking damages against the foreign party if and when it seeks to enforce the
judgment in the United States, an outcome that the Free Speech Protection Act of 2008
appears to advocate (though it would allow such damages preemptively without requiring the
foreign party to seek U.S. enforcement). S. 2977, § 3(c)(2). While such a remedy may seem
desirable to U.S. parties on its face and might provide additional safeguards for U.S parties
and deterrents for would-be libel tourists, a detailed analysis is unfortunately beyond the
scope of this Note.
378. Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at 834 n.5.
379. See supra Part I.A.2.
380. See supra Part I.A.4.
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difficulties in predicting foreign countries' enforcement of U.S. laws,38' the
most a U.S. court system can do to cull the reluctance to publish facilitated
by foreign lawsuits is grant U.S. parties the power to vindicate their
domestic rights.
CONCLUSION
The question remains whether legislatures will see fit to enact further
jurisdictional statutes regarding libel tourists and if the judiciary will see fit
to enforce them. Regardless, the practice of libel tourism will likely
continue to whittle away at the certainty and scope of First Amendment
rights. Applying the effects test to libel tourism cases is exactly the kind of
incremental expansion of jurisdiction in response to a modernizing society
that the U.S. Supreme Court rationalized in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson.382 In no way is this extension an unwarranted wholesale
expansion but a narrow application of personal jurisdiction in response to a
grave threat to constitutionally protected rights. While much work remains
to be done on the international front, the United States certainly has the
duty and opportunity to ensure that its citizens may avail themselves of U.S.
laws in response to unwarranted jurisdictional extensions by foreign
forums. While perhaps the costs of litigation may bar some U.S. parties
from availing themselves of the courts' declaratory judgments, the United
States should ensure, at a minimum, the right of access to U.S. legal
institutions for self-vindication. Only time will tell if further safeguards are
needed to facilitate a robust and unencumbered marketplace of ideas in the
evolving Internet age.
381. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
382. 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
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